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1. Introduction
Over the past few decades the Internet has unleashed an unprecedented
wave of transformation. In a relatively short period of time, the Internet
grew from a small experimental type of network interconnecting major
universities in the United States to a sophisticated web comprising bil-
lions of devices ranging from tiny sensors to smart mobile devices and
personal computers to huge data centers. Today the Internet is an in-
tegral part of our society, delivering vital services to people. Since the
early 90’s the Internet begun to evolve dynamically, with now virtually
any household in developed countries having a connection to the Inter-
net. The ubiquitous deployment of wireless networks, reduction in data
rate costs and the explosive growth of smart phones and tablet comput-
ers brought the number of the Internet connected devices to 12.5 billion
in 2010 according to a Cisco study [42]. It is unlikely that this rapid
growth will stop in the near future: the breakthrough in microelectronics
allows companies to manufacture powerful, but small in size microcom-
puters capable of connecting to the Internet over wireless links. These de-
velopments eliminated previously existing boundaries, allowing for novel
network applications to emerge. The most promising scenario is the ubiq-
uitous deployment of wireless sensor networks ranging in sizes from small
to large. It is roughly projected that the estimated number of connected
devices will grow tremendously: the Cisco report [42] predicts that there
will up to 50 billion of such devices by 2020.
Such a continuing spread of the Internet’s popularity and its penetra-
tion into our daily lives also places high demands on its dependability:
Even short outages in network connectivity can lead to serious economic
losses. For example, failures occurring due to bugs in software or defects
in hardware are commonplace, but they can also appear because of mis-
configuration of applications or even more fundamental flaws in system
9
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design. Nonetheless, all of this might have unpleasant, if not tragic, con-
sequences. For example, the lack of adequate resource allocation mech-
anisms may affect the execution of basic networking protocols, such as
packet forwarding, in a predictable manner because the principle of fair-
ness in such situations can be undermined: In this setting some users,
without malicious intent, can gain more network resources than some
other users, making utilization of the network unfair and inefficient. Bugs
in software and hardware problems can also lead to improper execution of
network protocols since packets can be dropped, altered or delayed in an
arbitrary way. Finally, misconfiguration can cause serious outages in net-
work connectivity. One example being misconfiguration in border gateway
protocol (BGP), which occurred in the past and lead to network blackouts.
Attacks, on the other hand, are more systematic and deliberate actions.
Malicious activity can appear, for instance, after nodes become compro-
mised by an intruder. And among many harmful effects, compromised
nodes can exhaust network resources, intentionally making network ser-
vices unavailable for some users. For example, one particularly noxious
problem of today’s Internet involves intentional attacks on the network
infrastructure. These attacks can range from rather primitive [26] to
highly sophisticated ones, such as successful attacks on root DNS servers
[148] or attacks utilizing sophisticated network of reflectors [123]. Pro-
tecting the network from malicious nodes in a timely and efficient manner
plays an immense role in ensuring stable end-to-end connectivity and the
proper functioning of various network protocols.
Similar problems may arise in future autonomous networks, such as
wireless sensor networks. In these networks each node has to behave in a
fair way, i.e., as expected, to ensure the correct operation of the distributed
system since misbehaving nodes can disrupt basic functionality, such as
routing, time synchronization protocols, or even cause inconsistencies in
the collected data. There is no guarantee, however, that we can prevent
nodes from misbehaving due to either the nodes being under the control
of an attacker or simply because of buggy software or hardware faults.
To ensure predictable performance of such systems it is, therefore, can be
desirable to evict non-cooperative nodes from the network in a fast and
reliable way.
At the other extreme, the quality of end-to-end communication also de-
pends much on last mile connectivity. Today, as the Internet edge be-
comes increasingly wireless, a lot of users rely on the availability of these
10
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networks. In fact according to the Wi-Fi Alliance [142], already today
about 200 million households use Wi-Fi networks, and another 750, 000
Wi-Fi hot-spots installed in public places. As these networks become more
crowded, the shared resource – wireless channel time – becomes scarce
and if not distributed in a fair way, the performance can be degraded sig-
nificantly for some of the users. Clearly, ensuring fairness and availability
of these networks is as important, if not more so, as ensuring fairness in
other parts of the network.
Thus, in this dissertation we investigate several mechanisms for dealing
with malicious and non-malicious (but equally harmful) faults. For exam-
ple, to cope with malicious nodes we study mechanisms which enable the
network to isolate the faults by accounting the nodes and evicting those
that do not behave according to desired rules. In the latter part of the the-
sis, the focus is shifted to problems in the wireless edge networks where
some users can disrupt proper network functioning by being unfair with
respect to other participants. Here, we study node penalty mechanisms
that enable the network to limit access to the shared resource for unduly
successful users, ensuring that all participants receive a pro rata share of
the resources and will not suffer from resource starvation. At the same
time, we are interested in reduction of the number of packet collisions in
the air in order to improve the overall efficiency of the network.
1.1 Research Questions and Scope
In present thesis, the main research question is related to the study of
several fault mitigation techniques in networks. We conducted the study
for the settings in which faults can be malicious and non-malicious. Thus,
to deal with malicious faults, we investigate accountability and node re-
vocation frameworks. In contrast, to mask failures in wireless networks,
which are not due to malicious behavior, we investigate several penalty-
based mechanisms, which allow the system to regulate the access to shared
resources fairly for all network participants. All of the above, in one way
or the other, is related to dependability of networked computer systems - a
field of study, which, among many other things, deals with the ways of im-
proving availability and reliability of computer systems by isolating and
removing faults [8].
Due to the big scope of the above research question it is impossible to de-
vise a single solution that would be suitable for all scenarios where such
11
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problems arise. On one hand, we limit the scope of our study to three dif-
ferent scenarios: resource exhaustion attacks in the Internet, node misbe-
havior in unattended autonomous networks, and resource sharing prob-
lems in wireless edge networks. The solutions we consider are different
in designs, but the overall purpose is similar - improve reliability and
availability of the target systems. On the other hand, some of the ideas
we develop can be potentially applied to other settings. For example, the
node revocation protocol that we investigate in the context of the wireless
sensor networks can be potentially applied to other types of networks [84]
which share common operational principles.
The first research question we study in this thesis is: How to account
nodes on the internet-wide scale and what are the requirements
for such architecture? Here we consider a network in which some
nodes are assumed to never become compromised and, therefore, always
operate as designed. These network elements, spread around the net-
work, take the role of trusted entities and belong to different adminis-
trative domains although always cooperating. We investigate what is the
required set of changes to the infrastructure is needed for the solution to
be efficient and deployable. We study this in the context of the Internet in
which compromised nodes can send undesirable traffic, endangering the
availability of network resources.
The second research question we investigate is: What are the building
blocks of node revocation protocols for the networks which lack
a centralized trusted entity? Here, the type of the network we con-
sider is comprised of nodes that are not operated by humans, and thus it
represents an autonomous class of network. Designing protocols for the
networks which lack a centralized entity coordinating their functions is
a challenging task: In such networks all nodes need to take equal roles
and to cooperate in order to carry out the functionality of trusted entities.
Here we perform the study in the context of wireless sensor networks. In
these networks relatively low-power devices, being unattended and possi-
bly deployed in hostile environments, can become faulty unnoticed or even
compromised by an attacker. Such nodes, if not isolated from the network
in a timely manner, can inflict tangible damage on the whole network.
Our final research question relates to fairness problems in wireless edge
networks. The question we investigate here is: Can short-term penal-
ties improve the fairness and availability of wireless networks
and how to fine-tune such mechanism in dynamic environments?
12
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Here we are concerned with the situations when non-malicious users can
cause damage unintentionally by congesting network and thus using re-
sources in an unfair manner. As a solution to this problem we propose the
node penalty mechanisms. We implemented these solutions in real hard-
ware and tested our hypothesis in various real-world settings. To confirm
our observations we further performed several rounds of simulations and
devised an analytic model. In addition, while analyzing the data sets, we
noticed that it can be non-trivial to represent fairness quantitatively for
the settings where nodes have different resource demands. To untangle
this ambiguity we proposed and evaluated a methodological tool.
1.2 Methodology
In this thesis we chose measurements as one of our main methodologi-
cal approach to validate our designs. For example, in our study of IEEE
802.11 wireless networks we have mostly preferred real experiments over
simulations because this approach has enabled us to observe the system’s
behavior in environments similar to those in which such networks typi-
cally operate, e.g., office buildings and residential areas. As part of the
measurement study, we also use basic principles of exploratory data anal-
ysis – a methodological tool which allows us to reveal trends in the data
using simple statistics and plotting. Of course, conducting controlled ex-
periments in real-life settings can be challenging or sometimes even im-
possible. In these cases, approaches based on simulations can become
preferential. Simulations can also be used to verify the correctness of the
results obtained in real-world experiments. In our work, we use simu-
lations mostly for the latter purpose. In addition, we apply more formal
methods in our study. For example, we use such an approach to study se-
curity protocols. Here, the goal is to reason about all possible flaws of the
design (under given assumptions and constraints), trying to ensure that
an attacker cannot exploit these flaws. Finally, we apply some techniques
of mathematical modeling to validate our hypotheses. For example, we
use elements of mathematical analysis in attempt to derive optimized pa-
rameters for some of our designs.
13
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1.3 Contributions
This thesis is a summary of five publications. Here we briefly outline the
contributions of each publication. We provide more elaborate summaries
in Chapter 3.
Publication I describes our initial view on the architecture enabling
node accountability and source address spoofing prevention in the Inter-
net. Publication II provides a more detailed view on the future Internet
architecture. It describes a framework which can transform the Inter-
net architecture into a flexible ecosystem allowing fostering of innova-
tion. Among many other aspects, the paper discusses a protocol enabling
Internet-wide node accountability and revocation while preserving pri-
vacy of the end-users.
Publication III presents our study of the node revocation protocol for the
networks lacking centralized, trusted third party. This work describes the
analysis of cooperative security protocol.
Publication IV presents an experimental effort with modified backoff
mechanisms applied to IEEE 802.11 wireless edge networks. The work
in Publication V evolved from the observations made in Publication IV.
Here we discuss a possible way of measuring fairness in the settings when
nodes have heterogeneous demands for network resources.
1.4 Thesis structure
The thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 we present the back-
ground relevant to our work and give an overview of the related work. In
Chapter 3 we summarize the results obtained in our publications. Finally,
Chapter 4 concludes the thesis.
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2. Background and Related Work
We start with a short overview of the background material. Thus, in Sec-
tion 2.1 we give a short overview of cryptography and cryptographic proto-
cols. This material is important for understanding concepts presented in
Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, where we delve into a review of the literature
related to accountability and node revocation protocols.
In the second part (Section 2.4), we first briefly discuss the principles
of operation of 802.11 wireless networks which are relevant to our own
research. Then we provide the review of the literature, covering a wide
spectrum of research related to these networks. In particular, we discuss
fairness and performance issues specific to these networks and the ways
these problems are tackled.
2.1 Cryptography and security protocols
Cryptography forms the basis for securing many computer systems. In
essence, cryptography is a practice of techniques for secure communica-
tion over insecure channels. In the following paragraphs, we review the
basic principles of cryptography, cryptographic algorithms and protocols.
2.1.1 Symmetric key cryptography
Parties that are involved in using symmetric key cryptography in order to
communicate need to share the same key to effectively perform encryp-
tion and decryption operations on messages. There are two types of sym-
metric cryptography algorithms: stream and block ciphers [141]. Stream
ciphers, as the name implies, operate on a stream of bits and perform
transformations for each bit individually, whereas block ciphers perform
transformations on larger blocks of bits at a time.
There exists an extensive number of block ciphers. However, nowa-
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days only few provide an acceptable level of security. Among these Triple
Data Encryption Standard (3DES) [113], Advance Encryption Standard
(AES) [115], and Twofish [135] are the most widely used algorithms.
Symmetric key algorithms have their advantages and disadvantages.
The main advantage of these ciphers is their computational efficiency.
This is mainly because symmetric cryptosystems do not involve complex
operations, i.e., big number exponentiation, division and multiplication.
Due to these reasons, the majority of end-to-end security protocols, such
as IPsec [74], Transport Layer Security (TLS) [36], and Secure Shell (SSH)
[156] use symmetric cryptography for securing data plane traffic. Unfor-
tunately, the application area of these cryptosystems is limited by the
complexity of a key management process, that among many other oper-
ations involves the distribution and revocation of secret keys in a secure
way.
2.1.2 Public key cryptography
In contrast to symmetric key cryptography, in asymmetric or public key
cryptography encryption and decryption keys are different. The keys typ-
ically exist in pairs [141, 130]: with one part – the public key – being open
to anyone and used to encrypt the messages; the second part – the pri-
vate key – is always kept secret and is used to decrypt the messages. The
fundamental property of any well-established public-key cryptosystem is
that the private key cannot be easily obtained from the public key. These
properties significantly simplify key management processes making this
class of cryptosystems attractive in many application areas. There are
many public key cryptography algorithms exist today, however, RSA [130]
is the oldest and most widely used algorithm. Elliptic curve cyptosystems
(ECC) [105, 78], on the other hand, are more recent and efficient [55].
2.1.3 Cryptographic hash functions
Cryptographic hash functions are another important building block in
modern cryptographic protocols. On the high level, as described in [141],
cryptographic hash functions produce a fingerprint – a string of a fixed
length (also called a image, or hash value), from an arbitrary long string,
also called a pre-image. Any secure hash function must contemplate the
following three fundamental properties. Pre-image resistance: for any se-
cure hash function it should be computationally hard to find a pre-image
16
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Table 2.1. Life cycles of popular cryptographic hashes2
1992- 1994- 1996- 1998- 2000- 2002- 2004- 2008- 2012-
MD5
MD2
SHA-0
SHA-1
RIPEMD-160
SHA-2
SHA-3
Unbroken Weakened Broken
that will produce a hash value identical to a given one. Second pre-image
resistance: given a pre-image it should be computationally hard to find
another pre-image such that when both are passed as inputs to the same
secure hash function, this function will produce identical hash values.
Collision resistance: for any secure hash function it should be computa-
tionally hard to find two distinguishable pre-image values such that both
will map to an identical hash value.
The number of cryptographic hash functions is rife. Nevertheless, only
few provide desirable level of security and performance. For instance,
widely used in the past, MD5 [129] algorithm is now known to be inse-
cure [153]. More secure versions are therefore suggested for use, such
as SHA-2 [114], the newly developed but not standardized SHA-3 [117] or
the even less popular RIPEMD-1601 algorithm for which no successful at-
tacks are known. In Table 2.1, we list several well known hash functions
and their corresponding security statuses.
Many keyed versions of different flavors also exist. Examples are HMAC
[82], CMAC [116] and PMAC [19]. Keyed versions of hash algorithms can
be used to produce message authentication codes (MAC), which resemble
a form of digital signatures of messages.
2.1.4 Digital signatures and key exchange protocols
According to [141] digital signature is a fingerprint that allows an inter-
ested party to uniquely identify and distinguish the signer of a message.
Thus, once a message is signed, the signer cannot deny its involvement in
originating the message [130]. Both public-key and symmetric-key cryp-
tography can be used to produce digital signatures.
The Merkle signature scheme is an example of a signature algorithm
1http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html
2Adapted from: http://valerieaurora.org/monkey.html
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that relies on symmetric cryptography. This algorithm is based on one-
time signatures (such as the one due to the Lamport [89]) and Merkle
hash tree [104]. The Merkle hash tree itself is an interesting concept.
On a high-level, it is a binary hash tree in which each of n leaf, Li, is
calculated as the hash of some value ai, and each internal node mij is
calculated as the hash of the concatenation of its two sibling nodes. Thus,
given a root of such tree along with the log(n) elements (on the path from
a specific leaf up to the root), it is easy to verify whether a message ai is
authentic or not.
Nevertheless, conventional public-key cryptography allows one to con-
struct more flexible digital signature schemes. Among the many algo-
rithms available, RSA [130], Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [119] and
its improved elliptic curve cryptography-based variant, ECDSA [119], are
commonly used in modern security systems. Many threshold-based vari-
ants of these algorithms are also available (for sampling see [138]). These
algorithms find their roots in applications where it is important to ensure
that the signature was constructed not by a sole holder of a private key,
but instead collectively by a group, in which each individual holds just a
part of a private key.
Key agreement protocols are another integral part of security protocols.
These algorithms are indispensable tools as they allow parties to exchange
a common (symmetric) secret without requiring a secure side-channel.
The examples of such protocols are Diffie-Hellman (DH) [37] and the more
efficient Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithms [27].
2.2 Fault isolation in the Internet
We now move on to the discussion of security threats on the Internet. In
this context, we devote much of the attention to the problem of denial of
service (DoS) attacks. We then present state-of-the-art solutions that al-
low network to account and isolate nodes on an Internet-wide scale. Here,
we discuss the advantages and limitations of different approaches.
Today there are indications that the Internet in the face of its ever in-
creasing popularity was not sufficiently prepared to repulse certain secu-
rity threats: The original design of the Internet concealed colossal poten-
tial weaknesses that malicious parties are able to exploit nowadays, and
so undermine some of the fundamental principles of the Internet. Once
the existence of these threats was understood, protecting the Internet be-
18
Background and Related Work
came a difficult task because the network already had a complex structure
with many nodes attached to it.
Many solutions for securing end-to-end communication such as HIP [108,
109, 57, 80, 111] on the Internet layer, SSL [46] and SSH [156] on the
application layer, have been proposed. Undoubtedly, without these initia-
tives the modern developments of Internet services would not be possi-
ble. Despite all the advantages, however, these solutions alone are hardly
capable of defending the end-hosts against attacks that were perhaps
unimaginable back in early 60’s and became commonplace nowadays –
DoS and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks – attacks aiming to make target
systems unavailable for a prolonged period of time.
Overall, it does not require deep technical knowledge to launch admit-
tedly rather primitive DoS attack on the Internet. For example, by anal-
ogy to a Smurf attack [26, 143] an intruder can undertake an attack by
sending broadcast packets, whereby source IP address is forged and be-
longs to a victim. In this way, if the packet is reflected by large enough
number of hosts [123], the victim would become unavailable on the net-
work as it will be unduly overwhelmed with packet processing routines.
In theory, as pointed out in [81], solving source address spoofing prob-
lem, and hence preventing or otherwise limiting the impact of some class
of DoS attacks, does not require complex mechanisms either. For exam-
ple, network operators can verify that the source addresses in packets
are valid and reachable from ports at which they were received [45, 11].
This protocol is mainly developed by Cisco, and is known as Unicast Re-
verse Path Forwarding (uRPF) [44]. The challenge, however, here is in
constructing and keeping the filters up to date: note, that maintaining
these filters manually is not practical or even feasible in large scale de-
ployments. And although there are works, such as [90], describing pro-
tocols for automating the filter construction, as indicated in [81], these
proposals still require expensive modifications to the functionality of net-
work elements on the path. Lack of deployment incentives, however, may
not come from technical challenges alone, as we shall see next because al-
though source address validation can limit the number of attacks on the
Internet, the approach falls short in preventing more sophisticated DDoS
attacks.
Probably started as fun projects, it was soon realized by the rogue com-
munity that DDoS attacks can generate revenue. Since then, more so-
phisticated tools appeared. Indeed, the appearance of botnets shattered
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the stability of the Internet significantly. In essence, botnets represent
networks of hundreds of thousands of computers that came under control
of an attacker. These compromised computers, however, would typically
belong to benign users who may not even have suspected that their ma-
chines were ruled by the attacker. Thus, most of the time these comput-
ers would generate legitimate traffic and only upon command from the
attacker would flood a victim with requests degenerating its ability to
deliver (perhaps vital) services. Targets of these attacks are not only sub-
jects to the exhaustion of bandwidth on access links. The attacks can also
target other network bottlenecks as well as exhaustion of computing and
memory resources on both servers and clients or, even on middle boxes.
And although end-host security solutions such as anti-virus applications
are widely available, in many cases these solutions can provide only post
facto cures to the problem, meaning that some exploits are patched only
after they were initially discovered and exploited by the attackers. And
the time taken from detection of these security breaches until they are
finally patched can be sufficient for the attackers to launch several suc-
cessful attacks. Yet there are millions of networked devices that do not
have such a basic security solution installed and thus can be easily com-
promised by attackers.
It is reasonable to assume that the fundamental shortcoming of the In-
ternet is in the lack of mechanisms which would allow end-points to effec-
tively defend themselves from the receiving of unwanted packets: Today,
once under attack, victims have very few tools at their disposal to shut
down, or even trace back the origin of the attack. The solution, therefore,
might be more controllable and accountable network elements, which in a
case of misbehavior can be identified and eventually shut down. Solving
this problem in practice, however, is hard. Not only is there a multitude
of technical challenges, but the entire ecosystem needs to be more flex-
ible to make it possible for the solution to find their path to large scale
deployments.
2.2.1 Capability mechanisms
One of the possible ways which can allow users to be in control of the
incoming traffic is to employ the so called capability-based mechanisms.
As suggested in [3], in these approaches senders obtain relatively short-
lived authorization tokens from the receivers. Senders then use these
tokens to stamp the packets, whereas the routers discard those packets
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without valid tokens, and destinations do not renew the tokens if they
suspect the sender.
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Figure 2.1. A capability-based DDoS limiting architecture. Adapted from [155]
The idea of capability-based approaches emerged first from overlay fil-
tering architectures such as SOS [75] and Mayday [3]. In these systems,
border gateways authenticate outgoing traffic and assign to it some se-
cret. Verified traffic is then passed to a protected destination through an
overlay. These ideas formed the basis for many capability-based Internet
architectures. One example is the work in [5], which was further revisited
by Yaar et al. in [154]. A more complete work describing the capability
architecture by Yang et al. emerged in [155]. In Figure 2.1 we give a
generalized view of such architectures.
There are also other studies that exhibit commonalities with capability-
based architectures. For instance, Host Identity Indirection Infrastruc-
ture (hi3) [112, 59] shares common design principles and can be easily
turned into capability-based infrastructure with DDoS-limiting features.
A very similar work can be found described by Liu et al. in [95]. Other
works such as in [24] devise a capability-based solution for flow-level
granularity. The authors proposed tunneling the traffic between servers
and clients through special cookie-boxes which can drop flows without the
required capabilities. A similar design is demonstrated in [51]. The au-
thors suggest that flows between clients and servers be moved inside pro-
tected tunnels. This ensures that the control over these flows can be ac-
quired at any point, for example, during attacks the sending rate can be
decreased artificially.
Certainly, capability-based solutions provide a fine grained and secure
way for access to the infrastructure: These approaches can potentially al-
low ISPs to reduce the scale of resource exhaustion attacks in the Internet
but at the cost of verifying cryptographic tokens along the path.
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2.2.2 Filtering mechanisms
In contrast to capability architectures, in filtering-based mechanisms vic-
tims directly request installing filters for suspicious senders. These so-
lutions can be pro-active in which the users install filters well before the
attacks take place (this is similar to how we punch the holes in our home
firewalls) and reactive in which users request installing filters once at-
tacks are detected.
One example of reactive approaches is the design in [94]. In their work,
the authors suggest StopIt architecture – a closed-control, open-service
traffic filtering architecture (Figure 2.2). In this architecture, any receiver
can use StopIt servers to filter undesired traffic from botnets comprising
million of hosts. StopIt is built to protect the network from two main
DDoS attacks: destination and link flooding attacks. The system uses a
cascade of servers from destination to source. In case of attack, a victim
sends filter requests to its nearest StopIt server. It is then the responsi-
bility of these servers to propagate the request as close to the attackers as
possible. The accountability mechanism described in Publication II shares
some similarities with this approach. Thus, for example, the way we han-
dle shut-up messages through trusted points in the Internet is similar in
spirit to the filter requests through cascade of StopIt servers.
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Figure 2.2. A StopIt traffic filtering architecture. Adapted from [94]
Though, such filtering-based solutions have several limitations. For in-
stance, AITF [6], being the most complete work on filters, verifies the
legitimacy of a filter using a three way handshake: if the link is flooded
during attack, the filter setup procedure can fail.
Some other frameworks, such as Pushback [102], instead of filtering
specific sources, mitigate attacks by limiting the rate of traffic from ag-
gregated prefixes. While such an approach can be effective, it can also
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introduce performance impairments for other, legitimate users.
Several pro-active filtering approaches also exist in the literature. For
example, in [13] the authors suggest that the hosts explicitly signal rout-
ing infrastructure with information about what traffic they are willing to
receive and from what hosts, similarly as one would do using its home
router, but the filtering is enforced closer to the source. This fact also
makes such approaches similar to some capability-based mechanisms.
2.2.3 Accountability architectures
Capability and filtering-based approaches can be indispensable against
DDoS attacks. However, as mentioned in [4], today many security issues
in the Internet are due to lack of accountability. Thus, deploying capa-
bility and filtering solutions which we discussed previously, can become
less useful if there will be no reliable way to identify and locate the at-
tackers. Of course there are solutions which provide for strong account-
ability of hosts in networks, such as port-based access control [65]. But
these mechanisms are designed for rather small scale networks, and they
are not fundamental part of the core Internet. Thus, their Internet-wide
adoption would require additional engineering effort.
One readily available way of implementing accountability is to rely on IP
addresses. For example, an end-host can authenticate itself to the edge
router by means that are acceptable within a given domain (for exam-
ple, using MAC address-based identification). Here the edge router, if it
vouches for the end-host, needs to ensure that the address of the end-host
is valid within its sub-network. In a similar manner inter-domain ac-
countability is achieved based on validity of observed IP addresses or do-
main specific identifiers. Source address validation architecture in [152]
standardizes some of these ideas (the work in Publication I can be used
as part of this framework, for example, to perform intra-domain account-
ability functions). However, for the approach to work well its ubiquitous
deployment is desirable.
Other approaches found in the literature (such as [139]) discuss the
possibility of storing packet fingerprints in the routers to allow hosts to
trace-back the origin of the attacks, and thus make attackers accountable
for their actions. Although, such architectures can be effective in detect-
ing the source of the attacks, they also impose significant burden at the
routers.
Most of the cryptographic approaches, however, rely on the non-repudia-
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Figure 2.3. Interactions in AIP protocol. Adapted from [4]
tion property of signatures attached to packets. Here, the ultimate goal
is to allow destinations to verify the signatures, hence the identity of
a sender. In comparison to non-cryptographic solutions, on one hand,
cryptography-based approaches offer finer-grained accountability. On the
other hand, these solutions are also more heavyweight since nodes must
be able to generate and verify some sort of cryptographic signatures at
line speeds for every packet sent or received correspondingly. Other chal-
lenges which are common to all cryptography-based solutions include is-
sues related to privacy and large-scale key management.
Accountable Internet Protocol (AIP) [4] is one example of such archi-
tecture. Here, the authors’ emphasis is on a fully distributed solution
which does not depend on any globally trusted authority. The idea of
AIP revolves around self-certifying identifiers, which are essentially self-
generated public keys used both for routing and accounting purposes.
Here, if a router receives a packet from unknown sender it drops the
packet and performs address verification procedure by asking the sender
to prove that it is a genuine holder of the address. A simplified view of
this architecture is shown in Figure 2.3. It is worth noting that the boot-
strapping phase in Publication I and Publication II are close in essence to
the address verification in AIP.
Similarly to AIP, in packet passports [93], transit and destination do-
mains can securely verify the origin of the packets (this architecture is
schematically shown in Figure 2.4). To achieve this, the packet passports
architecture uses efficient, symmetric-key cryptography to place tokens
on the packets which can be verified by autonomous systems (AS) along
the path. Unlike AIP, here border routers first learn the public keys of
ASes in the network, which are distributed along with border gateway
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Figure 2.4. Packet passports architecture. Adapted from [93]
protocol (BGP) route advertisements. Upon receiving an outbound packet,
the border router, if vouching for the sender, stamps the packet with the
secure tokens, one for each AS along the path. The tokens here are MACs
which can be verified only by the corresponding AS. On one hand, the
downside of this approach is that the border router needs to know the en-
tire path the packet will take from source to destination. This might de-
grade end-to-end performance if there is a discrepancy between the paths
assumed by the border router and the actual path used to forward the
packet. On the other hand, this allows victim to grasp by looking at any
packet exactly from where the attack has originated, and which transit
AS forwarded the packets. A very similar solution was proposed in [20].
Unlike the packet passports approach, in PLA or Packet Level Authenti-
cation [87] architecture the cryptographic tokens attached to the packets
are generated by the sender. The sender uses asymmetric signature algo-
rithms to construct such tokens, while the intermediaries and the destina-
tion can then use these tokens to verify the authenticity of the packets. To
make this verification process feasible, a sender also sends its certificate
along with the packet. PLA also can deal with node revocation. For exam-
ple, to filter packets from undesirable sources, PLA architecture employs
a mechanism that is very similar to the shut-off messages in AIP. In ad-
dition, in PLA, routers can blacklist certificates belonging to undesirable
sources. These interactions are schematically demonstrated in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5. PLA architecture. Adapted from [87]
2.2.4 Other mechanisms
Filtering and accountability are indispensable tools in dealing with DDoS
attacks. But there are also other solutions that can complement these ap-
proaches. For example, one way to deal with DDoS attacks is to reward
good users and to penalize attackers. Thus, in [150] the authors focus
on the ways to defend systems against application-level DDoS attacks by
incentivising users to increase their resource utilization. The key idea
of this approach is not to limit the clients as in capability proposals, but
instead to encourage hosts to speak up and consume more resources. As-
suming that attackers use their entire available bandwidth, they will not
be able to benefit from such encouragement. Benign clients, on the other
hand, typically using only a small fraction of the resources to send the
requests, will react to encouragement and increase the volume of traffic
sent or received. In this setting, good users can naturally penalize the
attackers by capturing a much larger portion of resources.
As discussed in [150], there are also proposals in which users are charged
in a currency to prevent massive DoS attacks on servers. For instance,
designs in which users pay to access the resources all fall into this cat-
egory. Here, the payments can be based on the computing resources of
the clients. Such approaches are typically based on computational puz-
zles [2, 7, 10, 40, 69]. However, the methods in this category can also
use real money in order to restrict the access the infrastructure. Exam-
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ple is the work found in [103]. Other proposals suggest to place clients in
a queue and advanced them in this queue based on their contributions,
e.g., amount of spent computational resources. For example, in [99] the
authors propose most-knocked first-served (MKFS) queuing mechanism
which preferentially admits users who pay enough with their CPU cycles.
Another way to deal with DDoS attacks is to over-provision the systems.
For example, service and network providers can employ additional ca-
pacities in order to defend against DDoS attacks [126]. Finally, there
are also a multitude of studies dealing with detection of DDoS attacks.
For example, some DDoS attacks can be detected by profiling user de-
mands [33] and avoided by blocking the outliers – users with abnormal
resource demands. Authors in [150] mention that approaches that pref-
erentially admit only humans are also widely spread. For example, cer-
tain DDoS attacks can be detected and prevented if the machines were
requested to provide information that can be replayed only by humans.
In this setting, bots that are typically programs running in stealth mode
on compromised machines would fail to access a resources that required
such interaction. A widely known examples of such defense solutions are
CAPTCHAs [49, 70, 107]. In fact, CAPTCHAs are probably the simplest
of all to deploy in real-life. However, we should note that these approaches
do not fully off load the burden away from critical infrastructure. Fi-
nally, approaches that filter out packets that contain invalid [68] or sus-
picious [123] fields can be also used to mitigate attacks or minimize their
negative effects on the infrastructure.
2.3 Fault removal in wireless sensor networks
There are other distributed systems which can be exposed to similar threats,
which we discussed in previous section. Examples are distributed smart
environments comprising objects communicating over wireless links. In
such networks, each node has to behave in a fair way, i.e., as expected, to
ensure the correct operation of various protocols. Here faulty nodes can
disrupt basic functionality, such as routing, time synchronization proto-
cols, or even cause inconsistencies in collected data.
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2.3.1 Cooperative security approaches
One way to deal with the problem is to allow nodes to cooperate and re-
voke faulty nodes. Thus, cooperative security can be understood as a
mechanism in which honest nodes in the network cooperate, ensuring
that all nodes behave in a fair way. For example, if the honest nodes detect
some unacceptable actions by some other node, they can react and rapidly
isolate such a node from the entire network. This concept emerged first
in the area of node revocation in wireless sensor networks [29, 28, 47].
One of the early works on distributed node revocation in sensor net-
works was proposed in [28]. The basic idea suggests that every node in
the network be configured with some revocation information against the
rest of the devices in the network before deployment. After the deploy-
ment, this information is used to revoke misbehaving nodes. Preloading
the revocation information during deployment inevitably leads to a need
for the rekeying of all the nodes in the network whenever a new node is
added. In other words, the scheme is more suitable for static networks.
Over time, more advanced versions of the protocol detailed in [28] ap-
peared. Thus, the limitations of [28] were first addressed in [47]. Specif-
ically, in this work, the authors introduced the Cooperative Security Pro-
tocol (CSP) concept which uses two voting procedures – one for admission
and one for revocation. On one hand, it was this design choice that made
it possible to mitigate the problem of high memory requirements. On the
other hand, the protocol remains suboptimal in terms of the number of
colluding attackers the system can sustain due to the type of keying ma-
terial data structure used in the protocol.
Several centralized approaches also exist in the literature [38, 92, 41].
In these solutions, a centralized node monitors all nodes in the network
either directly or through reports relayed by other nodes in the network.
These approaches can overwhelm the network, undermining the overall
performance of the system. Moreover, such setups may not be even possi-
ble if the network is deployed in a random fashion and lacks a centralized
entity responsible for coordination.
2.3.2 Miscellaneous
There are also similar studies in the area of node revocation protocols for
mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET). We outline several works we found in
the literature. The first work we mention [34, 106] advocates the suicide
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node revocation scheme. The idea of the protocol is simple. Whenever
a node finds some node to become faulty, it issues a revocation message
for both faulty node and itself. Such signed revocation message is then
broadcast network wide for the revocation to take effect. The shortcoming
of the scheme is the false revocation decisions, which can lead to a fast
network depletion.
Another relevant study considers a threshold based public-key cryptog-
raphy (PKC) [100] for realizing a node revocation protocol. In the protocol,
any node in order to join the network should request a set of its neigh-
bors to cooperatively construct a certificate. If the certificate is granted,
the node becomes a fully functional part of the network. It is the public-
key cryptography that makes the protocol scalable. The protocol exhibits
some limitations though. For example, the protocol can sustain a rela-
tively small fraction of faulty nodes due to limited number of nodes that
can generate the certificates.
There are also applications of mechanisms similar in spirit to the co-
operative security approach to secure the Internet routing infrastructure.
In this setting, the goals are different from those in node revocation algo-
rithms, but these mechanisms still share similar design principles. For ex-
ample, in [157] the authors suggest using verifiable voting among neigh-
boring Internet domains to ensure the consistency of the disclosed routing
information. There are also proposals that suggest using a variant of co-
operative security protocol to secure peer-to-peer networks [84].
Another relevant area is that of studies concerning group membership
protocols. These protocols belong to a family of distributed protocols in
which the processes can in the presence of faults agree on which processes
should remain in the group [128, 132]. Unlike cooperative security proto-
cols, these solutions lack the notion of the formation of small groups in the
network that perform node admission, monitoring and revocation tasks.
There are also other solutions which are similar in spirit to the proto-
cols we have discussed so far. Thus, state-machine replication is an ap-
proach used to implement fault-tolerant systems by replicating resources
and coordinating requests in a distributed way. Cooperative security is
close to the notion of Byzantine state-machine replication in which a set
of processors acts in unison masking Byzantine faults. For instance, this
is similar to the behavior of nodes in cooperative security in a situation
where monitoring nodes ask each other whether a node joining the net-
work has distributed enough revocation information. These ideas appear
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in the literature starting with Lamport’s paper [88] and followed by the
contribution of Scheider on fail-stop processors [133]. A comprehensive
overview of these concepts is provided in [134]. But again, these concepts
lack the formation of processor groups that can monitor and revoke some
other processor whenever latter starts to misbehave.
Furthermore, cooperative security is related to the work on fault-contain-
ment in the context of self-stabilizing algorithms. Here, a group of proces-
sors attempts to contain the effects of faults by handling these effects
locally so that other processors outside of the group are not affected. One
of the first work which investigates these concepts was presented in [48],
and a more general work can be found in [63].
The cooperative security protocols also show some links to failure de-
tectors. A failure detector aims at isolating the failed processes prior to
agreement, instead of directly dealing with them within the agreement
algorithm [30, 60]. In principle, intruder detection schemes which are
part of many node revocation schemes can use these approaches to detect
those nodes that become non-functional.
Finally, the lower-bounds of agreement protocols which are building
blocks of many distributed systems in which nodes need to agree on a com-
mon action are related to the results on the Byzantine agreement and its
crypto-variants. Lamport, Shostak, and Pease deserve the credit for their
term Byzantine faults [124] and their 3t + 1 lower bound proof. There is
a large body of work that suggests several variants to the original algo-
rithm, one example being work by Cachin et al. in [22].
2.4 Resource sharing problems in wireless edge networks
We now turn our attention to the problems in 802.11 wireless networks. A
thorough description of the operational principles of these networks can
be found in [120]. And in what follows we describe distributed coordi-
nation function (DCF) since its principles have utmost importance to our
own research.
The IEEE 802.11 DCF protocol was designed to reduce contention in
the wireless networks. For this purpose, in the standard implementation
a Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) al-
gorithm is used to schedule the access to the shared resource. In this
protocol, a node, before transmitting a frame, first checks if the channel
is idle or busy. If the channel is not idle, the station chooses a uniformly
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random backoff interval from the currently used contention window and
waits for the selected time before attempting to access the channel again.
If, however, the channel is idle, the station attempts to transmit the frame
and waits for the acknowledgment packet to arrive. A missing acknowl-
edgment packet is an indication of a failed delivery. At this point the
station attempts to recover from the failure by retransmitting the packet
again. The retransmission continues at most six times after which the
packet is discarded.
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Figure 2.6. IEEE 802.11 backoff protocol
After every failed transmission, a stations exponentially increases its
contention window to increase its odds at the next retransmission. Once
the packet is successfully delivered or discarded the sender resets its re-
transmission counter and starts with the smallest contention window for
transmission of a next packet. The Figure 2.6 shows this process for the
IEEE 802.11 wireless networks. And although the protocol copes fairly
well with its functions when the number of users is small (typically no
more than two, and not considering a setting involving hidden stations),
its dynamics can potentially lead to unfair resource usage for a larger
number of users.
Overall, there are several well-known problems with communication
in wireless LANs (WLANs) that affect the stability of these networks
in terms of throughput, delay and fairness. In particular, since nodes
in such networks use a shared medium in an unlicensed radio spectrum
to transmit the frames, collisions are possible. A measurement study of
large scale enterprise WLANs [31] showed that in their test-bed nearly
15% of sender-receiver pairs experienced significant loss due to collisions.
Whereas the measurement study in [131] indicated that in their network
the retransmissions can account for as much as 28% of all data transmis-
sions and 46% of data transmission time. Another problem is fairness.
The study in [39] showed that 802.11 networks have good short-term fair-
ness when the number of contending stations is small, e.g. just two, and
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becomes worse for an increasing number of stations. Furthermore, the
study in [79] shows that collisions, and hence frequent backoff phases,
can negatively impact the performance of TCP flows: The authors ob-
served that in WLANs, the TCP can receive bursts of acknowledgment
(ACK) packets and in response send bursts of data packets. Such an
anomaly, as mentioned in [79], impacts the performance of the network in
several ways, including an increased number of packet losses and signif-
icant network under-utilization. These results support the observations
made in [56, 58], that TCP in general performs poorly over wireless links
experiencing packet losses.
2.4.1 Performance modeling
The studies on modeling the performance of the standard IEEE 802.11
protocol find their roots in Ethernet technology as both share common de-
sign principles. For example, both technologies use exponential backoff
to avoid collisions on the medium. There is an extensive body of work
in which the performance of the protocol is modeled analytically. For ex-
ample the studies in [16, 83, 32, 97, 43, 85] can be a good starting point.
In these papers the authors proposed several assumptions that can be
made about wireless networks and derive analytic frameworks for model-
ing such important characteristics of IEEE 802.11 networks as through-
put and delay. Overall, most of the studies agree that the performance
of this protocol, although not optimal, can be improved by tuning certain
parameters. For example, one way to improve the throughput would be
to properly choose initial backoff windows depending on the number of
contending stations [16]; another way would be to vary the backoff fac-
tors accordingly [83]. In [39] the authors take a step forward and adduce
several key factors that impact the stability and the performance of wire-
less networks in one way or the other. Thus, using their model, the au-
thors prognosticate that backoff protocol alone reduces the performance
of these wireless networks by as much as 15%. The authors further men-
tion that at high transmission rates, packet losses increase significantly.
Finally, the authors also indicate that the short-term fairness in wireless
networks becomes worse for an increasing number of stations due to ex-
ponential backoff.
Overall, the distinctive lineaments of the majority of theoretical stud-
ies are the underlying set of assumptions and the tools used to validate
the theoretical models. For example, many works rely on controlled ex-
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periments in simulation frameworks rather than gathering empirical evi-
dence in real-world deployments. Typically such an approach is preferred
over real-world experiments to exclude the different artifacts that can ap-
pear during the course of experiments. But, on the other hand, although
modern simulation frameworks are powerful tools on their own, they still
cannot represent real-world environments in their full depth. Thus, real-
world measurement studies can give a possibility to look at the perfor-
mance of these networks from different angle.
2.4.2 Protocol optimization
There exists a considerable number of works that attempt to improve sta-
bility and fairness in wireless networks by using non-standard backoff
schemes. Thus, the work described in [140, 64] in one way or the other
suggests using non-standard contention windows. The key idea is to ei-
ther remove exponential backoff completely and use fixed contention win-
dows or non-standard backoff factors to reduce packet collisions. More
radical approaches exist such as in [25, 98] where the authors proposed
using non-standard state transitions. These works are similar in spirit to
our own solutions presented in this thesis.
Other studies proposed using frequency domain backoff [145] to improve
the performance of the wireless networks. The basic idea is to control
the maximum number of sub-channels that one node can access based on
the observed collision level. Thus if collisions are too frequent, a station
will back off (using either binary exponential backoff (BEB) or additive
increase/multiplicative decrease (AIMD) strategy) and reduce the number
of used sub-channels.
Certainly, collisions are not the only source of packet losses in wireless
networks. Indeed, packet transmissions can fail either because of time-
varying wireless channels (such as frequent changes of signal quality)
or contention (a race for channel access by two or more hosts, which in
practice can lead to simultaneous packet transmissions). In these set-
tings, backoff protocols help to avoid simultaneous transmissions, but
they are not designed to combat packet losses due to degraded channel
conditions. Instead, to aid the receiver to successfully decode corrupted
packets, some redundant information is typically transmitted along with
the original data. However, the amount of transmitted redundant infor-
mation depends on environmental conditions and is usually controlled by
physical layer solutions. To choose the right bit rate, the nodes can esti-
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mate channel quality with probing [18, 101] or using feedback from the
receivers [149]. Although these approaches can be accurate they can, as
indicated in [53], also incur significant overhead and can, therefore, neg-
atively affect system performance. To reduce this overhead, in [53] the
authors advocate sending the packets without any rate as a stream of
symbols representing a linear combination. Once the needed amount of
symbols is received, the packet can be decoded and its reception is ac-
knowledged to the sender.
The idea of using various network coding techniques recently received
a lot of attention from the wireless network community. The work by
Katti et al. [73] was one of the earliest to explore this direction in an in-
novative way. In their work, proposed a way to reduce the number of
transmitted packets (hence contention in the medium) by using a simple
xor operation on packets destined for different hosts. Later, the principles
of network coding became the basis for several other innovative designs.
For example, the studies in [50, 72, 71] all use smart network coding tech-
niques to improve packet delivery in wireless networks.
Another research direction that received much attention in recent years
is related to the possibility of utilizing the radio spectrum more efficiently.
Examples are designs that use multiple input-output antennas [91, 127]
to improve robustness and capacity of the wireless networks. These mech-
anisms, although orthogonal to the backoff protocol proposals, illustrate
one way of coping with simultaneous transmissions in the wireless net-
works.
Dynamically tuning the parameters of wireless networks is a separate
concern. The ability to accurately estimate these parameters based on
current load and the number of attached users can be a cornerstone in de-
termining the performance of such networks. One important aspect here
is how to make the adaptations, based on the number of active stations.
For example, Bianchi et al. [17] in their seminal work suggested using
busy slots to estimate the number of active stations. Cali et al. [23] in-
vestigate this direction further, and derive a metric which estimates the
number of active stations based on the observed number of idle slots. An
empirical evaluation of the ideas similar in spirit to those in [23] was pre-
sented in [52]. And although the approach has its merits, the accuracy
of such estimation in the presence of hidden terminals remains question-
able.
Other relevant studies consider using a centralized controller [151] in
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enterprise wireless networks. The controller periodically collects the in-
formation about used channel time, available bandwidth, etc.. Once this
information is processed at some central server, it can be used to fine-tune
wireless access points. Such approaches are suitable for closed-controlled
deployments since it is feasible to gather a global knowledge of the entire
network state and make accurate adaptations accordingly.
2.4.3 Measurement studies
There is a large body of work which employs a measurement approach to
illuminate the performance of large scale wireless networks. For exam-
ple, the studies in [12, 67] are an attempt to characterize wireless users
in a single but relatively large scale network (with an average of 12 active
stations attached to an access point) in a conference setting. In [146] the
authors attempt to illuminate such characteristics as the types of devices
used and type of traffic being transferred. The authors make several in-
teresting observations. For example, they discovered that the amount of
traffic in their settings in a download direction was prevailing over the
traffic in an upload direction, but the opposite tended to be true during
peak throughput periods.
Other wireless measurement papers focus on even more diverse scenar-
ios. For example, Rodrig et al. [131] measure overhead, retransmissions
and the dynamics of bit rate adaptation algorithms in wireless hotspot
networks. In [31] the authors conduct the research of IEEE 802.11 wire-
less networks using data collected from 150 radio monitors. This work
is interesting in the context of this thesis since it provides insights on a
technique for merging logs collected from different nodes. Henderson et
al. [62] investigate an even larger network comprising over 550 access
points and 7000 users involved. And perhaps the work by LaCurts et
al. [86] constitutes the largest study of real-world 802.11 networks. Thus,
their data set contained information from over 1400 access points from
all over the world. In the study, the authors take a step forward and try
to observe the existence of invariant properties in wireless networks, i.e.,
properties that do not change from network to network.
Although the aforementioned studies make important contributions to-
ward understanding and improving the behavior of wireless networks, a
limited number of papers discuss the empirical investigation of modified
backoff protocols in real-world deployments using cheap commodity hard-
ware. One such research is discussed in [52]. Here the authors report
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some practical implementation and evaluation of the modified backoff pro-
tocol using proprietary firmware and a small number of wireless stations.
Another piece of research [147] considers the implementation of MAC pro-
tocols in general on commodity hardware. Thus, a better understanding of
the real-life performance of modified MAC protocols on commodity hard-
ware still needs experimental evidence. In this thesis we attempt to make
a step in this direction.
2.4.4 Fairness and metrics
Fairness is an important performance characteristic of computer networks:
Several studies indicate that fairness has a direct impact on the stability
of wireless networks. And in the next few paragraphs we discuss some
of these works. For example, the study in [14] indicates that fairness is
extremely important in wireless networks for attaining low latency and
high availability objectives. Unfairness can also provoke an avalanche of
impairments at the upper layers. For example, the performance of TCP
connections might be severely degraded because of delayed data and ACK
segments. In [39] the authors mention that short term unfairness almost
certainly always leads to a longer term performance pathology in wireless
networks, impacting attainability of wireless hosts. In [96] the authors
investigate mixed upload download scenario in 802.11 wireless networks.
They observed significant unfairness: the stations performing upload ob-
tained considerably higher throughput than stations downloading.
In general, fairness deals with the distribution of network resources
among participants in a fair way, whereas max-min fairness [15, 35] is
a typical approach (in a single resource setting) to ensure such allocation.
To measure quantitatively the effectiveness of resource allocation, how-
ever, several useful tools exist. The study of short term fairness in IEEE
802.11 networks dates back to the early paper by Koksal et al. [79]. In
their work, the authors proposed using Jain’s index [66] with a sliding
window to characterize short term fairness in wireless networks. Such
a method was widely used by the community to study fairness in wire-
less networks [39, 52, 64, 9]. To measure fairness quantitatively in [14]
the authors derive a novel metric based on the number of packet inter-
transmissions. In their work, the proposed metric is compared with the
sliding window used with Jain’s index under homogeneous conditions: no
host is disadvantaged by its signal quality, traffic pattern, or spatial posi-
tion.
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On the other hand, some studies that focus on investigating the fairness
of transport layer protocols, such as TCP, over IEEE 802.11 networks con-
sider longer term fairness issues. Here a meaningful single value statistic
is used to describe fairness. For example, in [125, 110] the authors mea-
sure the fairness of TCP over wireless networks using average through-
put. And in [144] the fairness in wireless networks is assessed using both
average throughput and channel occupancy time. In [110] the authors in-
dicated that measuring fairness in real environments can be challenged
by, for example, hosts being sending packets at different rates. Thus, prior
to conducting controlled measurements a separate calibration step should
be performed.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter we introduced the essential background of this thesis.
We began with the introduction to cryptography and cryptographic pro-
tocols. We then discussed security threats in today’s Internet. As the next
step, we reviewed the approaches designed to mitigate DoS and DDoS at-
tacks on an Internet-wide scale. Here we introduced ways of dealing with
the problem by employing filtering, capabilities and node accountability
mechanisms, and whenever applicable we compared these solutions to
our own approach.
Next we moved on to the second area of interest in this thesis – node
revocation in wireless sensor networks. Here we covered approaches which
allow nodes to admit and revoke nodes in the network in a secure way.
In addition we compared these solutions to other approaches from related
areas. Thus, we showed their relationship to node revocation in mobile ad-
hoc networks, group membership protocols, fault-containment solutions
in distributed systems and several others.
We then moved to our third area of interest – resource sharing problems
in IEEE 802.11 wireless networks. Here, we first introduced the general
principles of the a backoff mechanism designed to manage and reduce
contention in these networks. Then we introduced the studies on the per-
formance modeling of these networks and covered literature related to
the various optimizations of these networks. We concluded the chapter
with the review of the measurements studies and a discussion of fairness
issues in IEEE 802.11 networks.
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This chapter discusses the published results of this thesis. First, we an-
swer the questions related to node accountability and revocation in the
Internet and describe our architectural effort in this area. Second we
present our design and analysis effort related to the node revocation pro-
tocol for autonomous networks. Finally, we present the design of our
penalty mechanism for wireless edge networks and discuss our experi-
mental experience. We conclude the chapter with open questions and sug-
gestions for future work.
3.1 Accountability, fault isolation and revocation
In these sections we describe our work related to the revocation of ma-
licious nodes from the network. We study this problem for two different
settings. In the first case, we consider that the underlying network is of
the Internet scale in which some nodes are assumed to be always trusted.
In the latter case, the assumed network comprises wireless sensor nodes,
none of which are assumed to be always trusted.
3.1.1 Accountability and revocation at the Internet scale
In publication Publication I and Publication II, the goal was to design a
node accountability mechanism for a network comprising multiple polit-
ically and financially independent domains with thousands of end-hosts
attached to each such domain. The design of such systems is challenging
for the following reasons.
Scalability. This requirement is stipulated by the nature of the Internet,
which dictates that there cannot be a single authority solely coordinating
its functions. Therefore, the designs must ensure the needed level of scal-
ability by requiring that there need not be any single trusted third party
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(TTP) – an entity which carries out such functions as identity and key
management – but all TTPs in the Internet must be globally reachable
and identifiable in a secure way. Each host in the network should be pro-
vided with a default TTP by its domain although the hosts may choose to
use another TTP, which must be approved by its current domain.
Computational efficiency. The majority of accountability designs need
to deal with the verification of some sort of information generated using
cryptogrphic algorithms. To this end, verification of such accountability
information must be a lightweight operation to ensure efficient packet
processing. Imposing a significant burden on every forwarding element
on the data path would increase the cost of the architecture, and can com-
plicate its adoption. It is desirable that the complexity of packet signing
are imposed on senders and to some extent on the border routers behind
which the senders are located. However, the accountability information
verification routines are not to be done on the data path and instead are
offloaded to some external entities such as, for example, TTPs. This will
reduce the complexity of the forwarding infrastructure.
Uniformity across domains. If a domain implements the accountability
interface, then every packet crossing its border should contain a suffi-
cient state, which will allow destinations and intermediary forwarders to
reliably identify who to contact to report an attack incident; as for the
TTP, this state should contain enough information about the identity of
an ultimate source to allow for the shut-up messages to reach the source
of the packets. Moreover, the shut-up messages must be a fundamen-
tal part of the system rather than a domain specific security mechanism:
although, domains can adopt their own intra-domain DoS defense mecha-
nisms, there needs to exist a unifying mechanism which is accepted glob-
ally because DoS attacks typically cross domain boundaries.
Support for privacy. It is also important to preserve the privacy of the
senders. Identity of a source should not be easily distinguishable from
packet headers by all but only by responsible TTPs. Revealing only the
TTP identifier and not the individual source in the packet makes it hard
for the third parties to track the sources. Of course, TTPs should know
the identities of their users, but there should be a guarantee that that
this information will be kept private. At the same time, TTPs should be
able forward shut-up message between each other. This is to ensure that
if a victim sends a shut-up request to its TTP, it will eventually reach the
TTP of the ultimate packet sender.
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Flexibility. Perhaps one of the biggest problem with the current Internet
architecture is its inability to accommodate radical changes ( there are
significant costs associated with even small scale changes to the infras-
tructure). The feasibility of the discussed frameworks depends much on
how easily these designs can be integrated into infrastructure. Thus, the
Internet ecosystem must be open enough to accommodate these changes.
Moreover, the proposed designs must be themselves flexible. For example,
it should be feasible for the TTPs, end-hosts and domains to upgrade in
order to support newer versions of accountability protocol. These changes
should not require global agreement, thus enabling coexistence of differ-
ent versions and making gradual transitions possible.
Our initial design of accountability architecture partially fulfilling the
requirements discussed in the previous section was presented in Publica-
tion I. In this work, we did not use a public key cryptography to construct
accountability fields for each packet. Instead, we make use of the public
key cryptography only during a bootstrap process – the phase when end-
hosts attach to the network and register with the edge or border router. In
latter phases, end-hosts use learn symmetric keys to create an account-
ability fields for the packets. The edge or border routers verify this field
during packet forwarding. This solution enables edge or border routers to
keep the binding between the cryptographic identities of an end-host and
its more ephemeral identity revealed to the Internet, which is useful for
privacy.
It is, however, desirable to preserve cryptographically generated state in
the packets even after they cross the domain boundaries. Preserving such
state all the way to the destination is useful in several ways. For example,
it makes possible to account for end-hosts across different communication
sessions or when they roam from domain to domain. Thus, in Publication
II, the challenge was in designing an accountability field that would pro-
vide the TTPs with information sufficient to shut-up hosts during attacks,
while not revealing this information to other parties in order to preserve
the privacy of an end-user.
Accordingly, when a node joins the network it first registers with a bor-
der router and its TTP. At this point, via a key exchange procedure source,
border router, and TTP establish shared symmetric keys. All three par-
ties also need to learn and verify the longer term identities of each other to
prevent various attacks: Such an approach prevents the source from con-
structing bogus accountability fields containing false information about
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the sender. On the other hand, in this way the source can also ensure
that it reveals its information to the correct party. At this point, the TTP
also learns the address of the source and border router such that the lo-
cation of both can be looked up in future.
After completing the bootstrap phase, the source can start its normal
communication. Here, when source sends a packet via its border router,
it attaches a valid cryptographic tag to the packet parameterized with
the secret key it shared with TTP and border router. To this end, the
grand purpose of such a tag is to prove that the source indeed vouches
for its packet. When border router forwards the packet, its task is to
verify the tag and generate an encrypted source address using the key
it shares with the TTP. Such an encrypted source address ensures that
border router verified the identity of the end-host, on the other hand it
also hides the sender’s identity from all but the responsible TTP. Together
tag, encrypted source address, TTP’s identifier, and some other random
information (known to both, the border router and TTP), when attached
by border router to the packet will allow any intermediary and destination
to request a shut-up from the TTP.
In the context of the architecture presented in Publication II, the net-
work deals with unwanted traffic by allowing the victims to tell an attack-
ing machine to stop sending packets to it via a shut-up message (SUM).
The concept of SUM was introduced in several studies [4, 94, 54, 137],
whereas in Publication II it is augmented with the support for privacy. To
enforce the SUM messages, however, a secure control-point somewhere
in the network close to the source can be used. Here, middle boxes in-
stalled at the ISP’s premises or hardware NIC installed on the end-hosts
can be used to prevent the sources from spoofing, as well as from sending
unwanted packets after receiving a valid SUM messages.
The prototypes of both architectures were built to demonstrate their
overall feasibility. Thus, in Publication I we experiment with an end-
user connected to an edge router which assumed to be controlled by an
ISP. The edge router functionality was implemented in a low power router
running the Linux distribution OpenWrt [122]. We choose such a setting
to favor deployments in which accountability functionality is enforced as
close to the sender as possible (in this manner our approach is similar to
the architecture in [61], which uses wireless edge routers to authenticate
packets of attached end-users). We use implementation of Host Identity
Protocol for Linux (HIPL) [1] to negotiate the pair of keys between the
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end-host and edge router, suitable for signing and verifying the data plane
traffic using the HMAC algorithm. A proof of a concept implementation
was also presented in Publication II. The goal of the implementation was
not to demonstrate the performance of separate components, but rather
to show the overall feasibility of the approach.
3.1.2 Cooperative node revocation
We now move to the next area in which faulty nodes can undermine fair-
ness and availability, and thus their timely isolation can in this way play
an immense role. In Publication III, we present a protocol designed to deal
with this issue in wireless sensor networks (although the applicability of
this protocol can be broader). On a high level, the protocol allows nodes
to cooperate and revoke faulty nodes in the network (Figure 3.1). There
are several key difference from the settings we discussed so far: First, in
the previous section we assumed that all TTPs are actively engaged in the
protocol execution, whereas in this case we assume that the presence of
the TTP is not guaranteed. Second, we assume that the nodes compris-
ing this type of network have limited computational, communication and
energy capabilities.
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Figure 3.1. Cooperative node revocation architecture. Adapted from [47]
The protocol consist of three phases: admission, normal operation and
revocation. The operation of the protocol starts with the admission phase.
At this point, a node can start to communicate with other nodes in the net-
work if a set of its neighbors agrees on its admission. After successful ad-
mission, the node starts its normal operation, i.e., executes the functions
for which it was designed. We denote such a phase as the communication
session of the node. Later, if the node is found to be faulty by its neighbors
(with the help of an intruder detection system (IDS)) an isolation phase
is initiated. To this end, if a positive agreement is reached, the node is
revoked network-wide. Otherwise the node drops its current communica-
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tion session and reattempts to join the network. According to the protocol,
all nodes play a dual role – they act as nodes joining the network as well
as participate in admission, monitoring and revocation of other nodes.
A mandatory condition for a node to join the network is the distribution
of partial revocation votes (PRVs) – cryptographically verifiable secret to-
kens – to its neighbors. Thus, prior to starting a new communication ses-
sion, a node distributes fresh PRVs to its neighbors via unicast messages
over secured channels (for example, depending on capabilities of sensor
nodes, one can employ a suitable variant of protocol described in [77] to
establish pair-wise keys). After this step, the neighbors need to decide
whether a sufficient number of such PRVs was disclosed. If these nodes
can find a positive agreement, they will admit the node into the network
and form its Dynamic Trusted Security Domain (DTSD). Each neighbor,
if it receives a PRV and participates in admission voting, also agrees to
participate in the monitoring of the node and, if needed, to carry out the
revocation procedure in the future. Finally, during the revocation voting
the nodes in the DTSD exchange the PRVs to reconstruct the revocation
vote (RV).
One of the fundamental building blocks of the protocol is the underly-
ing keying material data structure. We consider its design as one of the
core contributions in Publication III since the properties of the protocol
depend much on the choice of its structure. Thus, the emphasis was on
the following aspects.
Reduced number of nodes engaged in the protocol: In our work, the PRVs
and RV represent the points on the polynomial of the degree t. The PRVs
are the values computed, using this polynomial at points other than zero.
The RV is a special value and is computed using the same polynomial at
point zero. This design choice allows nodes to reconstruct the RV from
t+1 PRVs using the approach described in [136]. Here t is a configuration
parameter, and its choice depends on the size of the network and desired
level of resiliency – t is also the upper bound for the possible number
of colluding attackers in the DTSD. For comparison, in [47] the ratio of
minimum DTSD size and number of faulty nodes is significantly higher.
The possibility of reusing the keying material in the admission and re-
vocation phases was another crucial goal. This reduces the amount of
needed keying material as well as the communication and computation
complexities of the protocol. To achieve this we allow the nodes to use
the double hash values of the PRVs as votes during the admission vot-
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ing, whereas only the hash of PRVs and the actual PRVs are used during
the revocation voting. In this way, the votes disclosed in different phases
can be easily linked together. For example, a PRV or its hash value can
be compared to the double hash value of the PRV disclosed during the
admission phase using a single hash function evaluation.
Space efficiency: We were also interested in a data structure that is suc-
cinct enough and can be distributed among the nodes in the network in a
such way that each node holds only its small portion without compromis-
ing other properties. Thus, the space requirements per node for the pro-
posed data stricture are logarithmic with respect to the number of nodes
in the network. For comparison, the data structure in [28] has storage
requirements which are linear with respect to the number of nodes in the
network.
Computational efficiency vs. scalability: The design of keying material
in Publication III relies on symmetric cryptography. This type of cryp-
tography is very suitable for the scenarios involving nodes with limited
computational capabilities [76]. Thus, in Publication III, the PRVs and
RVs for different nodes and their different communication sessions are
authenticated using Merkle trees. Nevertheless, public key cryptography
can be used in the protocol to favor the settings in which better scalability
is desired. For instance, instead of having fixed sized Merkle trees, the
PRVs and RVs can be secured with asymmetric signature algorithms.
Another important building block of the protocol discussed in Publica-
tion III are the voting algorithms. We considered two different voting
strategies which rely on the keying material presented in previous para-
graphs. The first algorithm we considered is an agreement based on a
reliable broadcast of the double hash values of PRVs. The second algo-
rithm is based on a simple disclosure of the hash value of PRVs or plain
PRVs.
To reach a consensus, nodes can employ an agreement scheme using the
double hash of PRVs for admission, whereas the mechanism based on the
disclosure of the hash of PRVs or plain PRVs can be only used during
revocation. Here, the choice of a voting algorithm during revocation de-
pends much on the underlying IDS. If it is biased (can produce erroneous
decisions) two rounds of revocation voting are needed. During the first
round the nodes seek an consensus by exchanging the hash values of the
PRVs. The second round starts if a positive decision on the revocation
is found (i.e., a sufficient number of such PRVs hashes are exchanged).
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At this point, the nodes can safely disclose the actual values of the PRVs
and reconstruct the final RV value. Here the two rounds are necessary to
prevent false node revocations from the network. If, however, the IDS is
perfect, nodes can omit the first round, and directly disclose the PRVs.
We have analyzed the proposed protocol for two different settings. In the
first case, we assumed that the underlying IDS is perfect. In the second
case that the IDS was biased. We first showed that the protocol is cor-
rect, i.e. fulfills the properties of the cooperative security protocol under
the presence of c colluding attackers. Here we also devised the bounds
for the minimum DTSD size, the total number of needed PRVs and the
maximum number of colluding attackers. Thus, the system operates cor-
rectly when the number of colluding attackers does not exceed t and the
number of PRVs is at least 3t + 1 and the minimum size of the DTSD
is 2t + 1 nodes. This ensures that during the revocation, even if t nodes
are faulty, the RV can still be reconstructed by disclosing t + 1 PRVs. On
the other hand, when the IDS is biased, these parameters depend on the
probability of false positive revocation decision (made by node’s IDS) and
can be selected accordingly. The next bit of analysis was related to the
ability of nodes to propagate the revocation messages through the DTSD
when there are t colluding attackers present it. Thus, we analyzed this
property for a randomly formed network and for the network in which
each node has a direct communication channel with any other node in
the network. Next, we analyzed the protocol execution time. We demon-
strated this for the setting where all operations, such as message delivery,
IDS fault detection, were bounded. The last bit of analysis that we per-
formed was related to the comparison of voting algorithms. We compared
the (message and communication) complexity of voting algorithms which
rely on the proposed keying material with an approach that does not use
this keying material, neither during admission nor during revocation. We
concluded that the usage of the proposed keying material can potentially
simplify the studied revocation protocol.
3.2 Mitigating faults in wireless edge networks with penalties
In Publication IV we dealt with different type of faults from those dis-
cussed so far. Here we consider a wireless edge network in which nodes
use a shared medium in an unlicensed radio spectrum for communication.
We assume that nodes in this setting are non-malicious, but nonetheless
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can use resources unfairly. Here we investigate the possibility of enforcing
fair resource sharing by applying penalties to nodes.
3.2.1 Penalty backoff protocols
Unlike our previous approaches, here we are not dealing with deliberate
misbehavior but rather with failures that are more transient in nature
and caused by faults during a design phase of the protocol. Thus, we
do not suggest revoking unfair nodes from a network for a long period
of time. Instead, to avoid failures we propose to give nodes short-term
penalties. In this spirit, we proposed to incorporate a self-penalty mech-
anism in backoff function of the IEEE 802.11 networks. The underlying
principle of the proposed algorithms is simple: to penalize overly success-
ful nodes by attempting to increase their silent periods and accordingly
reward unsuccessful nodes with smaller waiting times. We hypothesized,
using also previous knowledge found in [98] as the bases, that such an ap-
proach could allow stations to utilize network resources more efficiently
and fairly. To test this conjecture, we implemented the proposed proto-
cols in real hardware, conducted multiple rounds of real-life experiments
and analyzed the collected data. In attempt to ensure the correctness of
the obtained results we also repeated the experiments in the simulation
framework.
Thus, in the context of this work, we experimented with two novel back-
off protocols and compared them with existing solutions. We briefly de-
scribe each protocol in the paragraphs that followed. The first protocol
which we studied was the standard IEEE 802.11 backoff protocol. This
protocol is used in almost all 802.11 wireless network deployments. We
used this protocol as a benchmarking baseline and compared it with other
algorithms. To meet our needs, though, we introduced one modification to
the protocol: in addition to experiments with a standard backoff factor
of 2.0, we also conducted the experiments with a broader range of values
([1.2, 2.6]) for this parameter.
The first non-standard algorithm, which we investigated in the present
thesis was penalty backoff. According to this algorithm, after a success-
ful transmission that does not require retransmissions, a station chooses
the largest available contention window for the consecutive transmission.
This is the self-penalty phase. In contrast, if the station fails to transmit a
packet without retransmission, its behavior is similar to that in the stan-
dard backoff: the station starts to exponentially increase its contention
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window and reattempt the transmission; and for the transmission of a
consecutive packet the station starts again with the smallest contention
window. In this way, we attempt to increase the odds of unsuccessful sta-
tions to transmit packets fast enough.
Rollback backoff is another modified version of the protocol that we in-
vestigated. In contrast to the penalty backoff algorithm, stations here
always start with a state that corresponds to the largest contention win-
dow (but optimized with respect to the current number of active stations).
If the station fails to transmit a packet, it exponentially decreases its con-
tention window and attempts to retransmit it. In this way unsuccess-
ful stations are rewarded. In essence this protocol can be viewed as the
reversed version of the standard backoff protocol whose principles were
covered in Section 2.4.
Finally, we also implemented and experimented with a backoff proto-
col with fixed contention windows [64]. This protocol is different from all
the protocols described above in that the contention window changes only
with the number of stations in the network. In other words, for all trans-
missions (including retransmissions), stations use the same contention
window size as long as the number of wireless stations does not change.
The contention window must be selected properly with respect to the cur-
rent number of active stations in the network.
We implemented the aforementioned protocols in open source firmware
[121] for Broadcom B43 wireless cards. This firmware features the im-
plementation of standard 802.11g Medium Access Control (MAC) mecha-
nisms for Broadcom/Airforce chipsets. For our experimental test-bed, we
used 12 wireless cards, four commodity computers, an Ethernet switch,
and a wireless access point running a Linux distribution OpenWRT. We
dedicated a single computer to play the role of a master node. This ma-
chine was responsible for sending commands to slave nodes to trigger ex-
periments and also participated in receiving and sending test traffic from
and to the slave nodes. This machine was also responsible for the syn-
chronization of the log collection process.
The other three machines were used as slave nodes. These nodes were
provisioned with a single wired connection and multiple (up to 5) wireless
cards. We also configured these machines with policy based routing to
send all control traffic such as commands and calibration packets through
wired interfaces. Experimental traffic was, however, carried over wireless
interfaces. Such a setup allowed us to separate control and experimental
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Figure 3.2. An example of test-bed setup. Adapted from Publication IV
traffic. In Figure 3.2 we show one of the deployments of the test-bed.
To collect the data, we instructed the kernels on the slave machines to
log on a per packet basis the information about the number of retries, ac-
knowledgment flags, packet sizes, used contention windows and backoff
intervals. In doing so we encountered a problem with the Linux kernel,
which did not allow us to log this information too frequently. To overcome
the issue, we recompiled the kernel with an increased ring buffer size for
debug messages and also increased the kernel printk rate limit. Upon re-
ceiving the packet transmission status notification from the firmware, the
kernel registers the event and logged it into ring buffer. The ring buffer
was periodically (every 0.1 seconds) read and dumped into a file. Each
event was also flagged with the wireless interface ID and a timestamp.
In total we used 12 wireless cards installed on three slave nodes. For the
majority of experiments, we have used 3, 6, 9 and 12 concurrently active
clients. We have balanced the usage in such a way that for any number
of active clients we have employed all three slave nodes in our test-bed.
Our eventual goal was to study the combined performance of all active
clients, which required merging the logs recorded on different machines.
Since the clocks on the machines were not in sync, we had to find a way to
correctly align our logs. The solution was to send calibrating beacons from
the master node to all slave machines via wired interfaces. In principle,
it would have sufficed to send a single beacon at the beginning of each ex-
periment, which the slave nodes would have recorded as a reference time
frame. Then subtracting this value from each packet’s timestamp would
yield a relative packet’s timestamp in the merged log file. Alas, this so-
lution is not perfect since in prolonged experiments the clock drift among
different machines would cripple relative packet timings by putting some
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of them unduly further into the future or the past. To eliminate the effect
of clock drift we instructed the master node to send beacons periodically,
with an interval of 10 msec. This made it possible to do the re-alignment
on short timescales.
Even though the beacons were sent with a strict 10 msec interval, there
was no guarantee that they were recorded by slave nodes with exactly the
same intervals. In fact, the various network, NIC or OS, effects could also
cause perfect inter-arrival time to drift. Incorrect beacon inter-arrival
times could then result in imperfect binning and thus undermine any
analysis that relies on the assumption of constant bin size. To assess the
possible drift in beacon timestamps, we calculated beacon inter-arrival
times for all logs. To our relief, inter-arrival times turned out to be sharply
clustered around 10 msec although the figure still showed rare outliers.
This could lead to a drift in cumulative beacon intervals among several
machines. However, we also calculated differences between respective
beacon inter-arrival times on different machines. It turned out that the
distribution was centered at zero, highly clustered and symmetric prov-
ing that bins calculated based on beacons remain equally sized in the long
run.
After ensuring that the data was properly collected and calibrated, we
turned to an analysis of the data sets. Our research agenda was to ob-
serve the behavior of all the protocols in various environments. Thus, we
were interested in the results for aggregated throughput, fairness, col-
lision probability, and the delays obtained for different protocols in four
various scenarios. In each of the experiments described below we varied
such parameters as number of active stations and used a backoff factor.
Accordingly, we review the key results of our experiments and discuss
them in the next few paragraphs.
Experiment with close proximity setting. Our first data set contained
data for the experiment in which the nodes were placed close to an ac-
cess point. Using this setting, we tried to imitate real-life, dense deploy-
ments of wireless stations. In summary, our experiments revealed that
the penalty backoff and rollback backoff both achieve significant improve-
ments in throughput characteristics in comparison with standard back-
off. For example, the average improvement of rollback backoff (config-
ured with the optimized parameter for backoff factor) over the standard
backoff (with the backoff factor 2.0) was 77%. Significant improvement
was also achieved for backoff with penalty (also when configured with the
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optimized parameter for the backoff factor). Another observation was re-
lated to backoff with fixed contention windows. In this setting the protocol
showed results comparable (or even slightly worse) to those of the stan-
dard backoff protocol.
The results for packet collision rate resemble similar trends. Thus, the
proposed protocols had a collision rate twice as small as the standard pro-
tocol. For example, the median packet collision rate for the experiments
with the different number of contending stations varied between 0.14 and
0.2 for the backoff with penalty and between 0.15 and 0.21 for rollback
backoff respectively. The results for the standard backoff were consider-
ably higher and were between 0.3-0.4 marks.
Closely resembling trends were also observed for fairness. Our data
showed that all protocols but the standard (with a standard value for the
backoff factor) had a nearly perfect fairness characteristic. We also ob-
served that the standard backoff protocol showed slightly better fairness
when it was configured with smaller values for the backoff factor. We
concluded that such a result was expected because when contention win-
dows are small enough, the chances of an arbitrary station capturing the
channel for a long period of time were insignificant.
The data set that we used to derive the results discussed in previous
paragraphs represented the setting in which wireless stations used the
dynamic rate adaptation algorithm 4. It was our next step to repeat the
same experiment involving 12 stations but now setting the wireless trans-
mission rate to a fixed value. The bottom line here was that all four proto-
cols were achieving comparable aggregated throughput. However, penalty
backoff and rollback backoff showed nearly perfect fairness in all exper-
iments. The same results were not achievable for the standard backoff
protocol.
Sparse deployment experiment. To corroborate our observations in the
close proximity setup, we conducted a set of additional experiments where
nodes were placed apart from each other by as much as 30 meters. Af-
ter analyzing the data sets we found that the trends in these experi-
ments closely resembled those in the close proximity setup. Thus, both
the penalty backoff and the rollback backoff showed nearly perfect results
for fairness. Similarly to the experiments in close proximity environment,
we also calculated the average improvement of the penalty based pro-
4In the test-bed, the stations were configured with dynamic rate adaptation al-
gorithm
51
Summary of Results
tocols over the standard backoff protocol. Thus, it turned out that the
improvement for the rollback backoff was > 70% in comparison with stan-
dard backoff. The result for the backoff with penalty was also significantly
better in comparison with standard backoff protocol.
Experiment with hidden stations. One particular adverse scenario which
can occur in the IEEE 802.11 network is when two (or more) spatially
separated nodes cannot reliably receive the signals from each other. This
phenomena is often called the hidden station problem, entailing in its
turn significant fairness and throughput impairments. This particular
scenario was immensely interesting for this reason. Thus, we sat down
to experiment with the two hidden stations. Regarding the goal of the
experiment, here we wanted to observe whether the penalty mechanisms,
built-in in our backoff protocols, could solve the problem without requiring
any additional mechanisms such as RTS/CTS.
In this setting, the penalty and rollback backoff protocols when config-
ured with the optimize backoff parameters achieved far better throughput
than the standard backoff protocol. The fairness characteristic, however,
turned out to be well below the limits that were considered satisfactory
for all three protocols. However, there was another very significant ob-
servation that was made. We observed that nearly perfect fairness was
achievable when the values for the backoff factor parameter exceeded
the threshold value of 1.6. Remarkably, even when configured with the
non-optimal parameter of 1.7, the throughput results for the penalty and
rollback backoff protocols were comparable to those obtained for the stan-
dard backoff protocol. In comparison, the fairness characteristic came to
around 0.9 for the penalty and the rollback backoff protocols versus 0.5 –
0.6 for the standard backoff protocol (In our work to represent the fairness
quantitatively, we used Jain’s fairness index [66]. According to this metric
the value of 1.0 corresponds to perfect fairness and 1/N (where N is the
number of users in the system) is the indication of total unfairness).
Experiment with download traffic. Our next experiment involved sta-
tions performing bulky downloads. After analyzing the data sets, we
observed that both the penalty and rollback backoff marginally outper-
formed the standard backoff protocol. But again, the fairness character-
istic for these two non-standard protocols was far superior than for the
standard backoff protocol.
Experiment with delay sensitive traffic. Our final experiment was de-
signed to understand the impact of our protocols on the per-packet delays.
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This experiment involved a traffic mixture comprising a low but fixed rate
UDP flow generated by a single station and several bulky TCP flows gen-
erated by multiple stations. All flows were generated in an upstream
direction from slave nodes to the master node.
The bottom line in this experiment was that the per-packet delays for
UDP flow were comparable for all three protocols. Moreover, for the op-
timized configuration of the protocols, the delays were sharply clustered
around 10ms, which corresponded to the original packet generation rate.
On the other hand, we observed that these delays tended to increase with
the growth of the number of stations. We concluded that this problem was
related to capacity planning rather than being an issue of the proposed
designs.
To corroborate the results obtained in our experiments, we also con-
ducted several simulation experiments using the NS-3 [118] framework.
We simulated the two main deployment modes described previously: the
close proximity setting and the setting with hidden stations. Our first
simulation setup included 12 stations attached to an access point, with
each station performing a TCP upload to a machine attached to a wired
network. Overall, the trends observed in the simulations supported our
previous empirical evidence. For example, the trend we saw in the real life
experiments in the close proximity settings was comparable to the trends
we saw in the simulations: the median aggregated throughput was 6.5
and 9.5 Mb/s for the standard and penalty backoff protocols respectively;
Similarly, the collision rate in simulations was around 13% and 4% for
the standard and penalty backoff protocols respectively. These numbers
are smaller than the collision rates we saw in real experiments, which
is certainly to be expected since the simulation provides an idealization
of many real mechanisms such as timers, queues, etc. Nevertheless, the
overall trend clearly persisted.
We also conducted the simulations for the setting with two hidden sta-
tions. The experiment was performed for the penalty backoff with the
backoff factor set to 1.2 and 1.7 and standard backoff (with the backoff
factor being set to its default value of 2.0). Upon analyzing the data we
concluded that real-life experiments and simulations both showed similar
trends. For example, while the median throughput was 1.6 and 1.9 Mb/s
for standard backoff and penalty backoff configured with r = 1.7 respec-
tively. The penalty backoff also achieved almost perfect fairness (0.93)
verses 0.69 for the standard backoff protocol.
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Figure 3.3. Comparison of the optimized backoff factor parameters found experimentally
and analytically. Adapted from Publication IV
When working with the empirical data, it became clear to us that the
proposed protocols achieve better performance when the values for the
backoff factor are carefully selected. Furthermore, we noticed that these
values depended on the number of active stations in the network. In
the experiments described these values were found empirically. To con-
firm these observations, we devised a mathematical model for each pro-
tocol and found the optimized values for these parameters analytically.
We compared these results with values obtained empirically for a vary-
ing number of wireless stations. For example, in Figure 3.3 we show the
comparison of the values obtained experimentally and analytically for the
first 12 stations.
In practice, the backoff factor parameters for the suggested protocols
should be adapted dynamically, based on the current system load and
number of stations communicating. This requires an additional mecha-
nism enabling correct protocol operation in dynamic environments. To
fill the gap, we designed and implemented two different algorithms that
allow the access point to choose proper parameters and configure the wire-
less stations accordingly.
We opted out of using the approaches based on counting an observed
number of idle slots as other works suggest [23, 52, 64]. We concluded
that these algorithms are harder to implement, but they can also be in-
accurate if hidden stations are present. Instead, we turned to approaches
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in which an access point estimates the number of active stations using
information about the number of associated stations and amount of traf-
fic each such station generates. Thus, in the first algorithm, the access
point simply counts a station as active if this station occupies the chan-
nel for a duration of time longer than some pre-configured threshold. The
choice of the threshold in this algorithm is purely empirical. The second
algorithm is more complex, yet it allows the access point to estimate the
number of active stations more accurately. According to this algorithm,
any station that occupies the channel for a time greater than or equal to
a fair share is considered as active. This coarse-grained estimate is then
augmented with an estimate of the stations that occupied the channel for
a time less than a fair share. Together these two values comprise a more
precise estimate for the number of active stations. Mathematically this
can be represented as follows:
Nactive =
∑
∀i
I(τi ≥ x) + 
∑
∀j τjI(τj < x)
x

where I(·) is an indicator function, τj is the duration of time (in a given
window T ) a station j occupies the channel and x is the fair share calcu-
lated as x =
∑
∀i τi
Nassociated
.
We implemented these algorithms in the Linux distribution OpenWrt
using hostap daemon - a piece of software that realizes wireless access
point functionality. We also introduced a new management frame. The
access point used this frame to convey the estimates to all stations in its
vicinity. Wireless stations, on the other hand, used it to select the correct
value of the backoff factor.
The final step was to validate these designs. In the experiment we em-
ployed all 12 stations out of which 6 of them followed an on-off pattern
and were sending traffic every other 30 seconds for a 30 second period.
The other 6 stations were continuously sending traffic. The experimen-
tal data revealed that the performance (time to complete the experiment)
for the setup with a simple adaptation algorithm and penalty backoff was
around 20% better than the performance for the setup with the standard
protocol. The performance gain for the setup with the second algorithm
was even more prominent.
3.2.2 Fairness and dynamic environments
During the course of our measurement study, we concluded that measur-
ing fairness quantitatively in dynamic IEEE 802.11 wireless networks (by
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dynamic settings here we understand environments in which nodes are
typically generating different amounts and types of traffic), can be a chal-
lenging task. This process can be complicated in multiple ways. For exam-
ple, in real environments it is common that different hosts have different
demands for a resource: some users can perform bulky upload, others can
be involved in communication sessions requiring sending few packets but
at a constant rate. This poses a question: How can we measure fairness
quantitatively in dynamic environments in which hosts might have uneven
demands for the network resource? To overcome this hurdle, in Publication
V we attempt to devise a fairness metric that can be applied to the above
mentioned scenarios. We showed experimentally how the results obtained
with this metric are different from other commonly used approaches.
Furthermore, we discussed a possible way how to use this metric in ex-
isting wireless networks to ensure better resource allocation. For exam-
ple, based on the outcome of this metric, a wireless access point can drop
packets or even impose penalties through other mechanisms (such as by
marking packets with a special flag) for some users, ensuring overall fair
resource usage. In other words we discussed the possibility of decongest-
ing the wireless network according to the demands of the users and the
amount of congestion caused by each user.
3.3 Open research questions
Having reviewed the main results of our research, we will now try to ar-
ticulate several possible future directions:
In Publication I and Publication II we presented several possible solu-
tions for node accountability and their possible deployment paths. Fur-
thermore, the work in Publication II covers many other building blocks
of future, evolvable Internet architecture. In this context, a further un-
derstanding of how these potential building blocks can be implemented
and incorporated into existing Internet infrastructure is of the utmost
importance. Here, real implementations in software defined networks and
a larger scale deployments of these protocols is an interesting research
direction. Another direction can be investigation of how to combine filter-
ing, capability and accountability approaches in order to build an efficient
and salable network auditing framework: Such framework could be used
to debug and resolve various network problems as well as isolate potential
sources of attacks.
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In Publication III we have explored the distributed security protocol. We
have limited our efforts to a single type of network in which this protocol
can be applicable – wireless sensor networks. There are several other
types of networks which exhibit similar properties. Thus, a possible fu-
ture research can be related to application of the protocol to these net-
works. For example, real-life implementation of the protocol for a peer-to-
peer network could be interesting.
Although our work in Publication IV covers a wide range of experiments
in different settings, this work can be still extended in multiple ways. For
example, we have demonstrated several mechanisms enabling protocol
adaptation in a setup comprising a single operating network. Here, it
can be interesting to investigate how to adapt the protocol for multiple
networks operating in the shared environment. Understanding how dif-
ferent networks comprising modified and legacy protocols can coexist de-
serves at least some attention: Performing a wider range of experiments
or even modeling such scenarios theoretically can entail ideas for more
efficient designs of wireless networks. Applying the discussed protocols to
most recently developed variants of WLAN networks could be also inter-
esting. For example, one could try to incorporate the ideas of the penalty
backoff into the design presented in [145].
And finally, in Publication V we merely scratched the surface when we
discussed a possible mechanism for improving fairness by giving penal-
ties to wireless stations based on their demands and actual usage of the
resources. We have attempted some preliminary investigations of these
ideas. However, this work remains to be far from complete, and thus one
could pave a further way in this direction. One could also investigate how
these ideas are related to the approach described in [21].
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4. Conclusions
In this thesis we addressed the problem of malicious and non-malicious
faults that impact the stability and availability of network services and
applications. Our main objective was to investigate several penalty and
revocation mechanisms designed to mitigate these faults, ensuring an ef-
ficient and fair network resource utilization.
Thus, in Publication I and Publication II, we considered that fairness
and availability in the Internet can be undermined by nodes which are
compromised and so deliberately exhaust resources on servers, clients
and other network bottlenecks. To counter these nodes we have designed
architectures to account for the actions of the nodes and to shut off ma-
licious nodes during attacks. Here, we investigated what are the needed
requirements for such Internet-wide accountability and node revocation
frameworks.
Next we moved on to a similar problem in wireless sensor networks in
which compromised nodes (or otherwise nodes that are non-malicious but
still faulty) can endanger the correct functioning of the network. To over-
come this hurdle, in Publication III we designed and analyzed the cooper-
ative node revocation protocol – a security protocol which allows nodes to
cooperate, ensuring fair utilization of network resources by preferentially
admitting only trusted nodes and revoking those nodes that have forfeited
this trust.
In Publication IV, we investigated a different, but related (in terms of
availability) problem. Here we considered a wireless edge network in
which some nodes can behave in an unfair manner, endangering resource
availability for some users. To counter such unfair nodes, we proposed us-
ing several penalty mechanisms incorporated into the backoff function of
IEEE 802.11 networks. We showed the effectiveness of these mechanisms
through real-life experiments and simulations. Furthermore, to facilitate
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the optimal operation of these protocols in dynamic settings, we devised
and evaluated protocol adaptation mechanisms.
And finally, in Publication V we took a closer look at the fairness prob-
lem in wireless networks. Here, we argued that fairness can be assessed
in a better way by taking into consideration the resource demands of the
users and the levels of congestion these users cause to the wireless net-
work. We showed how this metric is different from other approaches with
experiments and examples, and, finally, we discussed how our approach
can be used in existing wireless networks to ensure better fairness by im-
posing penalties (such as by dropping packets or marking them with a
special congestion bit) for unfair users.
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